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For the full version of “TABD : Putting the Business Horse Before the Government Cart” (Corporate Europe Observatory Briefing Paper, 25 October 1999) go to the following website : http://www.xs4all.nl/~ceo/tabd/berlinbriefing.html.
For more information on the TABD, see www.tabd.com.
On the 29-30th of October, over 100 CEOs from large corporations, as well as delegates from business organisations, government representatives and high-level civil servants from the EU and the US will meet in Berlin for the fifth annual conference of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) - arguably one of the most far-reaching and influential international corporate-state alliances. [2]
Through the TABD, EU and US based corporations develop government policy recommendations which the both governments in turn do their utmost to implement. In both Washington DC and Brussels, the TABD's access to the political process is remarkably institutionalised. The primary aim of the TABD is to build an integrated transatlantic marketplace and to develop and steer EU-US leadership in international trade negotiations such as within the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The vision of the corporations involved in the TABD is that the so-called “non-tariff barriers to trade” need to be removed, including a wide range of consumer, health and environment policies on both sides of the Atlantic. Examples of policies targeted by the TABD include restrictions on EU market access for genetically modified agricultural products, various European eco-labeling and recycling schemes, and US public spending provisions to support local economies. [3]
The annual conferences are where transatlantic industry recommendations are presented, in the words of the TABD, “to Governments for implementation.” [4] The TABD, with its usual self-confidence, “will insist on implementation of all deliverables and expect satisfactory and positive answers from Administrations.” A major theme at the Berlin conference of the TABD will be the WTO Ministerial Conference being held a month later in Seattle, where controversial issues surrounding a possible new round of trade and investment liberalisation negotiations will be discussed. At the TABD conference, they will use the opportunity to develop “detailed recommendations” for the EU's negotiators, knowing that the new European Commission confirms the TABD's role as “priority-setter.” [5]
Rather than being yet another example of a corporate lobby group successfully influencing and manipulating the political environment on behalf of its member companies, the TABD is initiated and nurtured by governments. Apart from the opportunistic pursuit of power, the politicians responsible for this corporate-state alliance act on the absurd, harmful and deeply undemocratic premise that corporate priorities should be the basis of trade policies and political decision-making in general.
“In the initial stages, there was a certain amount of scepticism because we thought transnational relations were best done between governments but the advantages of business involvement soon became apparent.” [74]
Since the first conference in Seville in 1995, the TABD has -- as requested by the governments -- formulated detailed demands for what the EU and US should strive for in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The TABD-government cooperation on “multilateral issues” has contributed directly to the birth of several WTO agreements. An example of how quickly things can develop when the two biggest trade blocks in the world operate in tandem to get a TABD demand implemented is the WTO's Information Technology Agreement. An agreement to eliminate tariffs on all information technology products was one of the main demands of the TABD's Chicago Conference in November 1996. According to then US Under Secretary of Commerce, Hauser, “this agreement was negotiated at the Singapore WTO Ministerial in December 1996 and finalised in March 1997 -- barely more than a year after the TABD made it a priority.” [75]
The TABD's own list of achievements includes the conclusion of the WTO Financial Services Agreement and the Telecoms Agreement (both approved in 1997), although the simultaneous pressure through other corporate groupings such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Financial Leaders Group should not be underestimated. The European Union, and particularly Trade Commissioner Brittan, played a leading role in the conclusion of these agreements, signalling a new, more aggressive EU role in pursuing global trade and investment liberalisation. [76]
Indeed, the support of the European Commission, with its strong powers over EU external trade policies, is key to TABD successes in the WTO. In the Commission's “TABD Implementation Table 1998”, the EC declares that it “fully supports the recommendations of the TABD regarding the multilateral trading system.” [77] As a result, the EC concludes, “nearly all WTO items identified by the TABD have been taken up in the EU-US Summit statement on the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) of 18 May 1998 and will therefore form part of the EU-US dialogue on multilateral issues on the TEP framework.” [78]
The report then goes into specific recommendations, revealing an almost complete overlap of TABD and EC positions. US academic, Green Cowles, points out that “while big business-Commission relations have developed in other policy areas over the past two decades, the Europeanisation of business-government relations in EU common commercial policy matters has only taken place over the past four years [since 1995, ed.]”. [79] Commission trade officials involved in the TABD, Green Cowles describes, were used to strive for a compromise between various national government positions and therefore “had to adapt to the TABD process in which the interests of TABD companies were taken into consideration up-front in the trade negotiations.” [80]
As in many other areas, the TABD and the Commission are mutually dependant on each other when it comes to global issues. The Commission needs the support of the TABD's corporate heavyweights to create political momentum for its WTO agenda. One of the Commission's main aims during last year's TABD conference in Charlotte, Virginia was to ensure business support for the Commission's “Millennium Round” ambitions -- a new round of comprehensive liberalisation negotiations in the WTO. [81] While there was general support for a new round to begin at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle (December 1999), there was some difference of opinion between EU and US business over whether to support WTO negotiations on new issues such as investment. [82] Mr. Reinhard Quick, European Group Manager coordinating the Global Issues group of the TABD, stresses that industry on both sides of the Atlantic strives for a “strong and efficient investment agreement” in the WTO and that the differences of opinion are strategic. One of the reasons that the US side is hesitant, Mr. Quick explains, is that “the NGOs have been making problems.” [83]
The general TABD demands for the Ministerial conference in Seattle were outlined in the Charlotte Declaration (November 1998) as well as in the Mid-Year Report (May 1999), but have been further refined over the summer and autumn, including high-level TABD meetings in Washington, DC in July and Helsinki in September. The TABD supports a three year round of “broad-based” trade liberalisation negotiations focusing on agriculture and services, trade facilitation, industrial tariffs, and WTO rules on investment and government procurement. [84]
Another issue high on the TABD's agenda is the WTO agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), which will be renegotiated from the year 2000. The Mid-Year Report calls US and EU governments “to vigorously oppose any attempts to weaken the protections achieved in the TRIPs accord.” TABD companies strongly advocate a removal of the current biotechnology exclusion in the TRIPs Agreement. This appears to be a thinly disguised attempt to use the WTO TRIPs agreement to undermine the exclusions in the 1998 EU Patenting Directive that had been secured by the opposition against this directive in the European Parliament. The TABD's Mid-Year Report also demands an even tougher WTO dispute settlement system, to prevent disputes to drag on unresolved for long periods of time and so that governments can avoid changing regulations by paying compensation.
The Berlin conference will be used to launch the TABD's final demands. Mr. Quick explains that the TABD sent its draft recommendations for the WTO Ministerial Conference to both the CEOs in the TABD and to the governments in the first week of October. “Everyone then comments on them, including government”, says Mr. Quick, and continues to explain the “on-going consultation process” : “At the Berlin conference we agree on the final recommendations, and of course EU and US government representatives are there too, so they know what is going on.” [85] The next step, says Quick, is to “check that the recommendations are being followed, and if they are not, we will be quite insistent that the recommendations be met or try to see if there is a problem and come to a solution.” [86]
That the EU officially decides its negotiating position already on October 11th is no problem, according to Mr. Quick : “These are just general guidelines giving the EU the mandate to negotiate in the WTO. They have to give the negotiators some room to see what happens during the negotiations and be flexible,” says Quick. [87] The TABD rests assured that its close connections to the Commission staff which coordinate WTO negotiations on behalf of the EU have been instructed that implementing TABD demands is a matter of high priority. This is very bad news for the broad coalition of environment and international solidarity groups that campaign against WTO trade and investment liberalisation.
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